Thus allocative efficiency is sensitive to the cropping pattern and the nature and forms of tenurial contracts. Marshall Principles, VI. The higher percentage of irrigated area makes it possible to cultivate boro paddy and potato cultivation in owned and fixed rented holdings.
On the other hand, sharecropped tenants are mostly interested in cultivating those crops which can meet their subsistence requirements and are less labour intensive in nature.
This is crucial because how much certain characteristics affect the contract choice system can provide information about the functioning of a micro-economy. Marshall Principles, VI. However, after controlling for possible sources of matching, risk-sharing is found not to have any significant influence on choosing a particular tenancy contract. Moderately efficient in allocating resources: 0. On non-irrigated holdings, on the other hand, aman paddy is the main food crop in share-rented holdings. It consists of three core chapters Chapter 4, 5 and 6 which include: an analysis of the productivity impacts of sharecropping; an examination of the conditions under which a sharecropping contract is chosen over a fixed-rent contract; and an examination of sources of incentives whereby particular types of tenants end up contracting with particular types of landlords or choosing particular crop practices.
Particular emphasis is given to the problems of sample-selection bias and endogeneity in the contract choice that very often plague the estimation results. On non-irrigated holdings, on the other hand, aman paddy is the main food crop in share-rented holdings. In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the "Marshallian inefficiency" of agricultural tenancy contracts.
The works discussed herein are mostly econometric analysis, although the thesis has attempted to locate the most relevant theoretical models to explain the econometric outcomes in each chapter. Allocative efficiency is influenced by the nature of cropping pattern and intensity of irrigation under alternative tenurial contract.
Daniel Ayalew. In fact, the wealthy tenants can take the whole risk associated with cultivation. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of allocative efficiency estimates at three different levels of cultivation. Empirical investigations presented in this thesis add to our understanding of the nature of contructual relationships within agricultural land tenancy markets. Table 4: Measurement of allocative efficiency and the nature of cropping pattern under alternative tenurial arrangements Source: Field survey
The statistical analysis has been made using DEAP statistical package In general, the level of allocative efficiency in owner cultivation is found to be almost at per with fixed rent tenancy. In this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian.
If the rains are expected to be poor, the cultivators prefer to sow aman paddy which requires much less irrigation. The first core chapter Chapter 4 attempts to analyse the impact of sharecropping compared with that of owner cultivation. Klaus Deininger,. While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in expla. In this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian. On the other hand, sharecropped tenants are mostly interested in cultivating those crops which can meet their subsistence requirements and are less labour intensive in nature.
This chapter contributes to an understanding of the factors which generate differences in input and output intensities across two comparative tenure regimes: mixed tenant and pure tenant. A similar trend of association between allocative efficiency estimates and alternative tenurial contracts can be seen in case of disaggregated level analysis for paddy and amanswarna cultivations. Among the households, who participate in the land-lease market as tenants, the results do not support the risk-sharing hypothesis of the agency theory as a motivation for contract choice, while there is some support that the monitoring problem affects the contract choice. The overall empirical results imply that due to non-availability of off-farm jobs, share tenants employ their optimal effort in crop production. Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how strategic response of tenants.
The only exception in this pattern is fixed rent tenancy where potato cultivation predominates followed by boro cultivation. The first academic contribution of this thesis lies in the comparison of conventional and non-conventional econometric methodologies.
Landowners and the Sharecropper's Productivity. Klaus Deininger,. While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in expla. The analysis draws from the principal-agent model where both parties are assumed to be risk averse.